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Abstract
We investigate the impact of manager political connection and founder status on tunneling in China's listed
firms from 2004 to 2010. By classifying the political connections into three dimensions with two categories of
controlling ownerships, we find that overall manager political connection is negatively related to tunneling in
private firms but positively related to tunneling in SOEs. The CPC/CPPCC-type connection is likely to
protect firms from tunneling, while the official-type connection facilitates tunneling from firms. The impact of
these two types of political connection on tunneling is stronger at the central level than the local level. A
chairman's political connection has significantly greater influence on tunneling than a CEO's connection.We
also find that firms with founder-managers have a stronger resistance to tunneling than those with non-
founder-managers, which is still observed in firms with politically connected founder-managers. Our results







Ma, L., Ma, S. & Tian, G. (2013). Political connections, founder-managers, and their impact on tunneling in
China's listed firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 24 312-339.





Political connections, founder-managers, and their impact on 
tunneling in China’s listed firms 
 
Liangbo Maª, Shiguang Maª*, Gary Tianª 
 














                                                          
    We would like to thank the participants at the Asian Finance Association (AsianFA) 2012 International 
Conference in Taipei and the 2012 China International Conference in Finance in Chongqing for their helpful 
comments. We are grateful to the anonymous referees’ constructive comments and suggestions. We appreciate 
Professor Ghon Rhee (the editor) for his advice and support. We also acknowledge the financial support from 
the Faculty Research Grant, Faculty of Commerce, University of Wollongong. 
* Corresponding author. Northfields Avenue, Wollongong, New South Wales 2522, Australia; E-mail address: 





Political connections, founder-managers, and their impact on 
tunneling in China’s listed firms 
 
Abstract:  
We investigate the impact of manager political connection and founder status on 
tunneling in China’s listed firms from 2004 to 2010. By classifying the political connections 
into three dimensions with two categories of controlling ownerships, we find that overall 
manager political connection is negatively related to tunneling in private firms but positively 
related to tunneling in SOEs. The CPC/CPPCC-type connection is likely to protect firms 
from tunneling, while the official-type connection facilitates tunneling from firms. The 
impact of these two types of political connection on tunneling is stronger at the central level 
than the local level. A chairman’s political connection has significantly greater influence on 
tunneling than a CEO’s connection. We also find that firms with founder-managers have a 
stronger resistance to tunneling than those with non-founder-managers, which is still 
observed in firms with politically connected founder-managers. Our results show that the 
incentives of various managers towards tunneling depend on their motivation for establishing 
relevant political connections.     
 
JEL classification: G32; G34 











When larger shareholders or other insiders such as managers have the capability of 
controlling the firms they may have an incentive to extract private benefits as well. The 
practice of expropriating value from a firm is commonly referred to as “tunneling” (Johnson 
et al., 2000) or “self-dealing” (Djankov et al., 2008). Friedman et al. (2003) find that 
tunneling by entrepreneurs who control the firms is prevalent in countries with a weak legal 
system.   The Chinese market has been criticized for its generally ineffective institutional 
system, weak investor protection, and lack of internal monitoring and external discipline 
mechanism. Tunneling behavior has frequently been detected in China’s publicly listed firms.  
Some studies have tried to identify the specific factors, in addition to the common 
regulatory environment, that determine tunneling in China’s publicly listed firms. Li et al. 
(2004) document that concentrated ownership exacerbates the expropriation of assets by 
block shareholders. Chen et al. (2005) indicate that the state as the controlling shareholder 
facilitates tunneling. Tang et al. (2004) concede that institutional ownership is favorable for 
tunneling, while Gao and Kling (2008) argue that having the state and institution as principal 
shareholders is not necessary to facilitate tunneling. Jang et al. (2010) show that institutional 
investors avoid investing in firms that experience severe tunneling and this problem is much 
greater in non-state owned firms.   
It is obvious that the existing literature on tunneling in China’s listed firms provides 
inconsistent evidence. In this research, we do not intend to duplicate any of the evidence to 
align with some viewpoints because we conjecture that there is a ‘hand’ behind the factors 
identified by the abovementioned studies, which is the ultimate determinant of the tunneling 
behavior in China’s listed firms. This ‘hand’ is the powerful ‘Guan Xi’ (relationship) in 
China – political connection. Political connection and its impact on firms’ performance in 





but it is more profound in China because political connection in China represents a 
complicated framework with three dimensions and permeates various enterprises. 
First, political connection in China can be categorized into two types. One is an 
official-type political connection where a firm’s manager is a current or former government 
official or military officer. The other is a CPC/CPPCC-type political connection where a 
firm’s manager is a current or former member of the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC) or the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Second, political connection in 
China is attributed to two levels of administrative hierarchy. One is that a firm’s manager 
holds or held a political position in local (provincial or regional) government organizations. 
The other is that a firm’s manager holds or held a political position in central (national) 
government organizations. Finally, firm manager in China is a brief concept that in reality 
can be either a chief executive officer (CEO) or chairman of the board who plays different 
roles in the firm. Thus, a firm can be politically connected by either its CEO or chairman, or 
both. These differently politically connected managers represent a diverse form of interests of 
shareholders, government organizations, and themselves and thus should have various 
incentives for tunneling.  
If a manager is the establisher of the firm, the manager is entitled to be a founder 
manager and the firm is entitled to be a founder firm. The founder manager may be a block 
shareholder of the firm or an expert in the production, marketing, and management of the 
firm. Literature shows that founder managers and non-founder managers have different 
incentives in a firm’s decision making (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson et al., 2009; Li 
and Srinivasan, 2011). It is expected that when founder managers are politically connected 
their incentives may have changed. 
In this paper we investigate the function of the ‘hand’ – political connection – in 





political connections in China’s publically listed firms into three dimensions: official-type 
and CPC/CPPCC-type, local level and central level, CEO’s connection and chairman’s 
connection. Accordingly, we fill a gap by analyzing the motivation of managers with 
different political connections towards tunneling, intertwined with firms’ ownership and 
managers’ founder status.  
We show that both political connection and founder status determines tunneling 
behavior and their impact varies in private firms and SOEs (state owned enterprises). 
Specifically, we find evidence that overall, manager’s political connection reduces tunneling 
in private firms, whereas it facilitates tunneling in SOEs. There is less tunneling in both 
private firms and SOEs with founder-managers than in firms with non-founder-managers, but 
the tunneling between founder-manager firms and non-founder-manager firms is significantly 
greater in private firms than in SOEs. When founder managers are politically connected they 
can still resist tunneling to some extent.  
We find that for private firms, CPC/CPPCC-type political connection significantly 
reduces firm tunneling, while official-type political connection has a positive but insignificant 
impact on tunneling. On the contrary, official-type political connection in SOEs significantly 
increases tunneling, while CPC/CPPCC-type political connection has a negative but 
insignificant impact on tunneling. These results are consistent with the nature of these two 
types of political connections.  
Finally, we show that a chairman’s political connection has greater influences on 
tunneling than a CEO’s political connection, in both private firms and SOEs. Political 
connections at the central level affect tunneling more than at the local level, for both official-






This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, numerous studies show 
that managerial attributes affect firm risk-taking, investment policy, capital structure, and 
other corporate governance practices (May, 1995; Adams et al., 2005; Fahlenbrach, 2009; 
Faccio, 2010). We show that managerial attributes such as political connection and founder 
status, can also have a significant impact on tunneling, so this study adds to the existing 
literature by identifying a new channel through which managerial attributes affect firm 
valuation and performance.  
Second, most existing studies of the Chinese market treat all political connections 
equally (Fan et al., 2007, Peng et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2012).  We not only find evidence that 
political connection affects firm tunneling, we also show that the impact of political 
connection between types of political connection (official- or CPC/CPPCC-type), hierarchy 
levels (local or central) and managers’ positions (CEOs or chairmen) changes significantly. 
In our study we take the private or state controlling ownership as a firm’s background, so to 
this extent, our study is also related to Wu et al. (2010), who find that the impact of political 
connection on firm performance, government subsidiary, and policy burden varies depending 
on the type of firm ownership. Third, this study contributes to the literature on founder-
managers in relation to political connections. The behavior of founder-managers and their 
impact on firm performance and valuation is attracting a great deal of academic interest 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Adams et al., 2005; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Anderson et al., 
2009; Fahlenbrach, 2009). The Chinese stock market is still in its early stage of development 
and the number of listed firms is growing fast, which suggests there may be a higher 
percentage of firms with founder-managers than in Western markets,1  and yet there are only 
                                                          
1 Founders are managers in more than 21% of our sample firms, with a percentage of 33% for private firms and 
15% for SOEs, respectively. The overall percentage of firms with founder-manager almost doubles that in the 





a few studies that directly examine the impact of founder-managers in the Chinese market 
(e.g., Wang and Wang 2011; Zhang et al., 2011). These two papers examine the relationship 
between founders and venture-capital performance, and the relationship between a CEO’s 
founder status and turnover. We examine the impact of founder-managers from a different 
perspective, including political connection, which gives a better understanding of the impact 
of founder-managers in China and provides an important complement to the literature that 
still largely focuses on Western markets.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
existing literature. Section 3 presents the institutional background in China and lays out our 
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the samples and data. Section 5 reports our empirical results. 
Section 6 carries out robustness tests and Section 7 concludes our paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Impact of ownership structure and firm characteristics on tunneling 
A large number of studies examine the relationship between the structure of firm 
ownership and the nature and severity of tunneling by controlling shareholders. Berkman et al. 
(2009) and Jiang et al. (2010) find that the incidence of tunneling through loan guarantees 
and related lending is greater in private firms than in SOEs. Both Chen et al. (2009) and 
Cheung et al. (2010) find that firms controlled by the central government are more likely to 
be propped up, while firms controlled by local governments are more likely to be tunneled. 
La Porta et al.  (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), and Faccio and Lang (2002) provide empirical 
evidence that firms belonging to business groups and being controlled by the ultimate owner 
through a chain of companies are more likely to be tunneled. The ultimate controlling 
shareholder exerts control over lower-level firms in the chain without necessarily having a 





the controlling shareholder a strong incentive to extract private benefits and expropriate 
minority shareholders. 
Researchers also examine other factors that may affect tunneling behavior. Cheung et 
al. (2006), Gao and Kling (2008), and Jiang et al. (2010) all find that tunneling is more severe 
in small firms relative to large firms. Gao and Kling (2008) find that the proportion of 
independent (outsider) directors is negatively associated with the severity of tunneling. Both 
Gao and Kling (2008) and Jiang et al. (2010) find that auditors do play a monitoring role with 
respect to reducing firm tunneling, but the latter point out that non-clean auditor opinions 
alone are not enough to deter tunneling. Finally, Jiang et al. (2010) find that good 
performance (ROA) in the previous year significantly reduce tunneling in the current year, 
whereas Cheung et al. (2006) show that the market-to-book ratio in the previous year is not 
negatively related to the likelihood of connected transactions; rather, it is positively 
associated with certain types of connected transactions that are of a tunneling nature. 
 
2.2 Impact of political connection on firm performance and valuation 
 The literature finds both positive and negative impact of political connection on firm 
behavior, performance, and valuation. On the positive side, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) 
find that politically connected firms have preferential access to loans from state owned banks. 
Li et al. (2006) find that politically connected firms gain favorable regulatory and legal 
treatment, while Boubakri et al. (2012) find that politically connected firms enjoy lower costs 
of equity capital than their non-connected peers because investors consider them to be less 
risky. Finally, Faccio et al. (2006) find that politically connected firms are significantly more 
likely to be bailed out by governments.  
On the negative side, Cheung et al. (2005) find that political connection worsens the 





firm, while Fan et al. (2007) find there are more bureaucrats and fewer professionals on the 
boards of politically connected firms in China. Consequently, these firms underperform their 
non-connected peers in both the short term and long term.  Faccio (2010) finds similar 
evidence using cross-country data. 
 
2.3 Impact of founder-managers on firm behavior and performance 
Research on the impact of founder and founder-managers generates extant literature 
with mixed empirical evidence.  On one hand Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) find that firms with founder-managers have a higher market valuation and better 
performance than firms without founder-managers, while Fahlenbrach (2009) finds that firms 
with founder-CEOs invest more on R&D, have higher capital expenditure,  and make more 
focused M&As, and Li and Srinivasan (2011) find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity is 
higher and the level of pay is lower when there is a founder-director on the board.  
On the other hand Johnson et al. (1985) find that stock markets react positively when 
a company founder suddenly dies, suggesting that founder control has a negative effect. 
Leone and Liu (2008) find that compared to non-founder-CEOs, founder-CEOs are 
significantly less likely to be fired following an accounting irregularity, which indicates they 
are probably entrenched. Anderson et al. (2009) find that firms with both founders and heirs 
are significantly more opaque than firms with diffuse shareholders and founders and heirs 
tend to exploit this opacity to expropriate minority shareholders. 
Firms with founder-managers account for about 11% of the largest public firms in the 
US (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) whereas firms with founder-managers make up more than 21% 
of all our sample firms (or 33% for private firms and 15% for SOEs). Yet the impact of 
founder-managers in the Chinese market attracts little academic interest. As one of few 





discover that being a founder makes a CEO less likely to be replaced involuntarily. Wang and 
Wang (2011) find that the performance of a cross-border venture capital firm is strongly 
related to the founder’s departure. These authors argue that the departure of the founder is an 
indication of the firm’s transition to a modern corporation.  
In summary, the literature on the Chinese market examines tunneling, political 
connection, and founder managers from various perspectives but in an isolated manner. This 
study differs from existing studies in that we integrate these three lines of research and 
investigate how manager’s political connection and founder status can influence tunneling.   
 
3. Institutional background and hypotheses 
3.1. Institutional background of the Chinese markets 
 The Chinese stock market offers a natural setting for studying the tunneling activities 
of controlling shareholders for the following reasons. First, Chinese firms are commonly 
dominated by controlling shareholders with highly concentrated ownership. In a bid to 
recapitalize the ailing SOE sector, the Chinese government initiated the share issue 
privatization (SIP) reform with public share ownership in the early 1990s. In the preparation 
of IPOs, most selected SOEs went through a partial restructuring process where part of the 
assets and businesses of SOEs (often the best performing units) were either carved out or 
spun off to become publicly listed firms. The parent companies retained the majority of 
shares in the listed firms and also served as the controlling shareholders. Our data shows that 
the ultimate largest shareholder of a median SOE holds 40.87% of ownership. Deng et al. 
(2006) argue that such a parent-subsidiary structure provides controlling shareholders with 
strong incentives and the capabilities of engaging in tunneling activities. In recent years an 
increasing number of privately controlled firms are listed on the market. Private firms have a 





on average, still has 32.60% of all control rights, which is above the 30% criterion set by the 
CSRC in determining effective control.2  
Second, the corporate governance system in China is still incomplete because China 
lacks a well-developed legal and investor protection system, which means minority 
shareholders have few channels through which to take action against controlling shareholders 
when their rights are jeopardized (McNeil, 2002; Allen et al., 2005). Although the China 
Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) is the official regulator of the stock markets in 
China, it lacks investigative and prosecuting power and sufficient resources to effectively 
enforce its own rules. External discipline is also weak in China. For example, takeovers and 
other forms of competition for corporate control (e.g., proxy contest) are far from common. 
The news media, which plays a significant role in improving corporate governance in 
Western markets (e.g., Miller 2006; Dyck et al., 2010), is ineffective in China due to tight 
government control of the news media sector. 
Third, China is a politically dominated country where the Communist Party is the sole 
ruling party and other parties assist the Communist Party in improving its governance. 
Nominally, the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC) is the legislative institution and the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is the advisory body and the 
government is in charge of routine decision making and governance. In reality, the 
government retains the highest power while the other two organizations perform assisting 
roles. A prominent politician may hold a position in the government and/or have 
contemporary membership of the CPC or CPPCC. The national system of administrative 
control is a pyramid structure where, under the administrative control of the central 
government, there are 31 provinces and municipalities (excluding Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
                                                          
2 “Notice about Issuing ‘Guides to Constitutions of Listed Companies’”, CSRC, December 16, 1997 (in Chinese, 






Macao). A province controls a number of regions and a region administrates a number of 
counties, but the government and the CPC and CPPCC are embedded in each of these 
administrative hierarchies. Members of any of the three political at all levels enjoy special 
rights and personal benefits, either explicitly or implicitly.     
To summarize this up, in transiting itself from a highly centralized planned economy 
to a modern market-oriented economy, China has been unable to synchronize other necessary 
and complementary reforms such as property rights, investor protection, and corporate laws. 
The concentrate ownership and salient institutional environment makes the Chinese stock 
market conducive to frequent and severe tunneling by large shareholders. Managers with 
different political connections represent diversiform interests of shareholders and government 
organizations, and thus may impel or prevent tunneling in firms. 
 
3.2. Hypothesis development 
3.2.1. Manager’s political connections and firm tunneling 
The majority of publically listed SOEs in China were mainly transformed from large 
state-owned enterprises that carved out or span off their profitable businesses and assets and 
restructured them into independent legal entities for listing. Thus, publicly listed SOEs have 
two notable features; one is that they have parent corporations, and the other is that the 
government retains the largest ownership stakes.  
 These parent corporations were reorganized with the remaining assets and labor 
resources in the original state owned enterprises after the publicly listed SOEs were carved 
out. Normally, the listed SOEs were affiliated to their parent corporations in both ownership 
and management teams’ nomination, at least for a certain period after the SOEs were listed, 
but the assets and labor resources are of a lower quality than those in the listed SOEs because 





and market competition. The parent corporations did not always receive fair compensation 
for carving out high quality resources in the period before the SOEs were listed, thus, they 
expected to receive valuable feedback from the listed SOEs in the future, and so felt that such 
action was reasonable.   
The government retains the largest ownership stakes in the publicly listed SOEs, 
either directly or via their parent corporations, and holds the ultimate decision making rights 
in those firms3. These newly listed SOEs often assume the legacies of a planned economy 
because their primary goal is social stability and sustainable government power rather than 
maximizing shareholder value.  To fulfill these goals, listed SOEs may be required to transfer 
some assets and resources to support the government’s social and economic policies.   
To ensure the listed SOEs follow the requirements of both government and their 
parent corporations, both governments and parent corporations have strong incentives to 
appoint politically connected manages to run the listed SOEs, and these managers, being 
more concerned about their political future, 4 are often willing to collude with government 
controlling shareholders and their parent corporations and engage in tunneling activities. 
Thus, we propose that: 
H1a: Overall for SOEs, manager political connection is positively related to the severity of 
firm tunneling. 
 In contrast with SOEs, most private firms were listed because of their overall 
qualifications, with only a few being carved out from existing enterprises. Several listed 
private firms were formerly listed SOEs who relinquished their controlling stakes to private 
                                                          
3 Of course in some cases, the government may choose to relinquish their stakes by selling it to private entities, 
resulting in “private control transfer”. However, as Chen et al. (2008) find, there were only 62 such private 
control transfers during 1996 and 2000. 
4 In a year 2000 survey cited by Chang and Wong (2004), Communist Party Committees and governments have 





entities, which  means the parent-subsidiary structure is not as common here, and the 
associated incentive for the parent corporation to tunnel is less severe in listed private firms . 
Despite the fact that the private sector has been the main engine of China’s economic 
growth over the past two decades, private firms are still being discriminated and 
disadvantaged in many areas. Governments, either central or local, still maintain considerable 
control over the allocation of resources such as land, energy, and awarding of government 
projects and procurements, etc. Bank loans, a primary source of external financing, flow 
disproportionally to SOEs despite their poor performance (Cull and Xu, 2000). Private firms 
often face many administrative obstacles in trying to obtain licenses and enter certain 
industries. Furthermore, private firms are frequently discriminated against when it comes to 
the enforcement of contracts with governments or SOEs.  
To overcome this imperfect market mechanism and disadvantage in resource 
allocation, private entrepreneurs have strong motivation to enter politics or to establish 
political connections (Li et al., 2006). Unlike listed SOEs who must put up with various 
social burdens imposed by the government, private firms strive to obtain benefits through 
political connections, but do not need to bear the social burden, and as a rule, the government 
does not intervene in the operations of private firms through the political channel. Thus, we 
expect that: 
H1b: Overall for private firms, manager political connection is negatively related to the 
severity of firm tunneling. 
 
3.2.2. Different types and levels of political connections and firm tunneling 
 Managers’ political connections in China can be categorized into two broad types: 





These two types of political connections are of very different natures and consequently have 
different impacts on firm behavior, including tunneling activities.  
Official-type political connection is where a firm’s managers are/were government or 
military officers. The government (including military) officers take charge of routine decision 
making and governance, such as resource allocations, fiscal grants, license issuance, industry 
restructure, monetary policy, municipal projects, and so forth. Although overall private firms’ 
political connection is hypothesized to be negatively related to tunneling in our H1b, their 
official-type connected managers may have rent seeking motivations. While they directly 
bring many benefits to the firms such as industry access and bank loans through their political 
network with government authorities, they often require some rewards, so it may prove costly 
for firms to maintain these connections. 
Similarly, official-type politically connected managers in SOEs may pursue personal 
rents for the benefits they bring into the firms and cost the firms’ wealth to build their 
personal relationships. However, it is more important whether the government intends to 
expropriate the SOEs whenever it is necessary to achieve their social goals.  
Official-type connected managers in SOEs usually keep their administrative position ranking 
in line with the size and importance of the firm’s business and their political future depends 
largely on how well they carry out the policies and instructions of the relevant local or central 
governments, the controlling shareholders of publicly listed SOEs.  
Furthermore, the higher the level of official-type political connections, the greater the 
benefits these connections may bring to the firm, but in return, the larger rents required, and 
consequently more possible expropriation. Thus,  
H2a: For both private firms and SOEs, manager’s official-type political connection is 
positively related to tunneling. This positive relationship is stronger when the political 





 CPC/CPPCC-type political connection is where a firm’s managers are/were members 
of the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC) or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC). In contrast with government officers, members of the CPC and 
CPPCC have two characteristics; first, many of them are not members of the communist 
party, particularly in the CPPCC, second, many of them have expertise in science, technology, 
industry, and business management. Although some of them are former veterans of 
government officers, they, except for a few who hold contemporary positions in government 
agencies, actually do not participate in routine and specific decision making as government 
officers do, and therefore managers connected to CPC/CPPCC are less likely to bring direct 
benefits to the firms so they have no bargaining power for personal rents and are unable to 
make effective commitments to the government.  
Instead, because the CPC and CPPCC are legislative and advisory bodies, managers 
with connections to them are, to some extent, capable of preventing firms from adverse 
events such as unfair treatment from related parties in legal disputes, market shares, access to 
resources, and asset transactions. They are also able to raise unfair treatments in the CPC and 
CPPCC that the government should deal with, which also protects these firms from tunneling.    
To show participation in governance from multiple parties, diverse nationalities and 
all classes of people, members of the CPC and CPPCC are positioned high in the political 
hierarchy. They are entitled to the same remuneration and welfare as government officers in 
the equivalent hierarchy, plus political privileges such as being immune from custody. 
Members of the CPC/CPPCC are expected to demonstrate integrity and impartiality as 
evidence that the government is being monitored effectively and because they enjoy social 
and personal benefits, competition for the limited membership of the CPC or CPPCC can be 
fierce. In fact, ceteris paribus, members who are guilty of misconduct may lose their 





To maintain their position and retain a good image, a manager who is a member of the 
CPC/CPPCC is less likely to expropriate the firm’s assets. Furthermore, relative to 
CPC/CPPCC members at the local level, those at the central level attract greater scrutiny, 
either from the market, the media, or from within the organizations. Consequently, those at 
the central level have even stronger incentives not to engage in wrongdoing such as tunneling.  
Thus, 
H2b: For both private firms and SOEs, manager’s CPC/CPPCC-type political connection is 
negatively related to tunneling. This negative relationship is stronger when the political 
connection is at the central level than at the local level. 
3.2.3. Founder-managers and firm tunneling 
Founder-managers are those who were either founders or main executives when a 
firm was first incorporated or spun-off for public listing. They were quite experienced with 
the firms’ establishment, IPO process, and operations as publicly listed firms. Founder-
managers at public SOEs were normally appointed by the state to lead these newly listed 
firms. In some cases they were instructed by governments to set up new businesses to solve 
the legacies of long term underperformance of SOEs and other social issues such as high 
unemployment and pressure on the government’s fiscal budget. To encourage these managers 
to run the firms appropriately, governments often granted them a certain amount of equity 
ownership. Our data shows that in SOEs, the average equity ownership is 0.35% for founder-
managers and 0.07% for non-founder-managers, with the difference significant at the 1% 
level. The performance of these firms has been linked to the reputation of founder-managers, 





Most of the listed private firms in China were originally family firms established by 
private entrepreneurs who were most likely to be the largest equity owner.5 The founders 
often assume the position of chairman, CEO, or both, and still hold a large ownership stake, 
even after the firms were publicly listed. Because founder-managers of private firms invest 
most of their wealth into the firms, they have a stronger motivation in their firms’ long term 
survival and continuous development, and are extremely desirous of passing profitable firms 
and sustainable assets to their descendants.    
 Founder managers in both SOEs and private firms are most likely to be more 
painstaking than non-founder-managers, indeed the relation between personal benefits and 
firm performance is also stronger for founder-managers than non-founder-managers. 
Founder-managers usually regard the firms as their life success and thus try hard to avoid 
having the firms fail. This motivates them to take a longer term approach (Fahlenbrach, 2009) 
and restrain the firms from tunneling. 
Founder-managers can also be politically connected, but as we point out above, 
founder-managers often have high monetary interests which are closely linked to firm 
performance. The motivation for a sole founder-manager not to tunnel is stronger than the 
motivation to tunnel, whereas a sole politically connected manager may not be so motivated 
because of the interest and efforts of trade-off, i.e., the interest obtained from one unit effort 
is larger from a founder’s perspective than from a politically connected manager’s 
perspective, and even if a politically connected manager engages in tunneling activities, his 
incentive to tunnel is likely to be reduced if he is also a founder-manager.  Thus,    
                                                          
5 We find that, in our sample firms, the ownership of the largest shareholder (which is often the founder) is 
28.49% for founder-manager firms and 21.19% for non-founder-manager firms. The difference is significant at 





H3: For both private firms and SOEs, firms with founder-managers have less tunneling than 
firms without founder-managers, regardless of whether the managers are politically 
connected or not. 
3.2.4. Different impact of the Chairman’s and COE’s political connection on tunneling 
 So far in this paper we have made no distinction between either the chairman’s or the 
CEO’s political connections with respect to their impact on tunneling, and while such a 
distinction may be irrelevant for firms in Western countries where the chairman is usually not 
involved in the day-to-day running of the firm (except for executive chairmen), the situation 
in Chinese firms is quite different. Existing literature on the Chinese stock market has 
different opinions as to who the top executive in a Chinese firm actually is; for example, Fan 
et al. (2007) regard the CEO as the top executive, whereas Firth et al. (2006) consider the 
chairman to be the top executive because they argue that the chairman is often involved in 
day-to-day decision making in Chinese firms. Meanwhile Kato and Long (2006) also 
consider the Chairman to be the top executive insofar that the chairman is paid a salary by the 
firm. Furthermore, existing literature pays almost no attention to the possible different impact 
that a chairman and CEO has on firm behavior. 6 
In China, the chairman is the legal representative of a firm and in most cases is 
appointed by the controlling shareholder. Given the highly concentrated ownership structure, 
the chairman is more likely to be powerful and exert enormous influence on the daily 
operations of the firm. Kato and Long (2006) argue that even when the chairman and the 
CEO are both responsible for daily operations of the firm, the chairman is likely to be more 
                                                          
6 One notable exception is Wu et al. (2012). These authors find that politically connected CEOs play a more 
important role than politically connected chairmen in the operations in local SEOs, and politically connected 
chairmen have greater influence than connected COEs in obtaining government subsidies in private firms. But 
other than these, there is no distinct difference between chairmen and CEOs on firm value, government 





powerful than the CEO. The relative power of the chairman and the CEO can be proven by 
the following two facts; first, founders in private firms, who are often the controlling 
shareholders, are more likely to take the position of chairman rather than CEO,7  second, it is 
widely regarded as a promotion in SOEs when the CEO is appointed to become the chairman, 
and a demotion if the chairman loses his chairmanship and becomes the CEO of the firm. 
Thus, we expect that,  
H4: For both private firms and SOEs, the chairman’s political connection is more influential 
than the CEO’s political connection on tunneling behavior.  
 
4. Sample and data 
4.1. Sample selection and data source 
 Our initial sample consists of all non-financial A-share issuing firms listed on either 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2004 and 2010. We 
chose 2004 as the starting year because membership of the Chinese Communist Party was not 
officially open to private entrepreneurs until late 2002, when the 16th National Congress of 
the Communist Party amended its Party Constitution (Xinhua News Agency Nov. 18 2002). 
The Chinese Communist Party was officially opened to private entrepreneurs to provide more 
opportunity for private entrepreneurs to be selected as government officers. This also 
signaled that the CPC and CPPCC would accept more private entrepreneurs as members. The 
procedure from submission of application to official assessment and ratification normally 
takes a couple of years, although it may vary among different applicants.  
In our sample we exclude firms where the ultimate largest shareholder is a foreign 
entity, and also firms cross-listed overseas (including Hong Kong) because foreign 
                                                          
7 We find that, of the 1130 private firms with founder-managers, 1108 founders take the position of the 





accounting rules may affect the treatment of “other receivables” and some other accounting 
items used in this study.8 We then delete the observations of the first year of listing because 
Chinese firms commonly engage in pre-IPO earnings management that results in unusually 
high levels of various forms of related party transactions and fund transfers in the first year of 
listing. After eliminating observation sets with missing data, our final sample consists of 
1591 firms and 9499 firm-year observation sets, which is larger than those in most previous 
studies on tunneling in the Chinese stock markets. 
We obtain our accounting and financial data from the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, which is one of the most widely used databases for 
research on the Chinese stock markets. We hand collect the information on manager political 
connection by checking the “Directors and Senior Executives’ Profile” in annual reports. 
However, annual reports rarely mention whether or not a manager is a founder, so we search 
the internet through Google, Baidu, and Wikipedia. We consider a manager to be a founder-
manager if any one of those sources explicitly mentions so and no other source indicates 
otherwise. 
 
4.2. Measurement of variables 
4.2.1. Tunneling 
Three approaches have generally been used to measure tunneling in China: related 
party transactions (Cheung et al., 2006), loan guarantees to related parties (Berkman et al., 
2009), and fund occupations (i.e., inter-corporate loans in Jiang et al., 2010). We do not use 
the first two measurements because: (1) the issuance of any new loan guarantee was banned 
by the CSRC in June 2000; and (2) the approach used by Cheung et al. (2006) requires an a 
                                                          
8 Our sample includes firms that also issue B-shares (in addition to A-shares), since these firms must abide 






priori subjective judgment on whether a certain RPT is beneficial, expropriating, or neutral to 
the listed firm. The limitation of such a subjective judgment is evident. For example, Cheung 
et al. (2006) consider all asset sales by a listed firm to related parties to be expropriating; but 
it’s obvious that the nature of such transactions depends on whether the prices paid are above, 
below, or the same as in arms-length deals. Therefore, we follow Jiang et al. (2010) and use 
fund occupation by controlling shareholders as a proxy for tunneling, which is the ratio of the 
total amount of “other receivables” in the balance sheet to total assets. 
“Other receivables” is an accounting item that includes receivables that are not part of 
ordinary business transactions. These receivables are essentially interest free loans made by 
listed firms to other parties where a large proportion of these funds are occupied for a long 
period of time, and in many cases are never paid back to the listed firms (Jiang et al., 2010). 
The advantage of this measurement is that, unlike the approach used by Cheung et al. (2006), 
it is relatively easy to tell who the beneficiary of this particular form of tunneling is. In 
addition, fund occupation through the “other receivables” account by controlling shareholders 
and their affiliates is such a widespread tunneling practice in China that the CSRC has issued 
several rules or decrees aimed specifically at tackling this issue. However, this practice 
remains prevalent because the rules are not enforced. For our sample firms the balance of 
“other receivables”, on average, accounted for 6.00% of total assets (or 138 million RMB) in 
a private firm  and 3.90% of total assets (or 227 million RMB) in a state-owned enterprise 
(SOE), which represents a heavy cost to the listed firms. Moreover these figures are almost 
certainly underestimated since many of the affiliates cannot easily be identified with 
controlling shareholders. 
4.2.2. Manager political connection 
Faccio (2006) defines a firm to be politically connected if one of the firm’s large 





closely related to a top official. However, in the Chinese situation Chen et al. (2011), Fan et 
al. (2007) and others extend Faccio (2006)’s original definition by considering China’s 
specific circumstances and define a Chinese firm to be politically connected if a manager is a 
current or former (1) government official; (2) military officer; (3) member of the Chinese 
People’s Congress (CPC); and (4) member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC). Therefore we follow Chen et al. (2011) definition to identify 
politically connected managers. To examine the impact of these types of political connections 
on firm’s tunneling behavior we categorize managers’ political connections into two broad 
types, namely official-type connection (if a manager has the above (1) or (2) connection), and 
CPC/CPPCC-type connection (if a manager has the above (3) or (4) connection). To test the 
impact of political connections at different levels, we further classify all political connections 
into central level connections and local level connections (province or lower). Thus, we now 
have up to six different types of manager political connections in our formal tests. 
4.2.3. Founder-manager 
To remain consistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Adams et al. (2005), we 
consider a manager to be a founder-manager if she/he was a founder or a main executive 
when the firm was first incorporated, or when it was spun-off.  
4.2.4. Control variables 
 To control for other factors that may affect tunneling,  we include the following 
control variables in our regressions: a dummy variable indicating that the firm has completed 
the non-tradable share reform (Reform), the difference between the controlling shareholder’s 
control rights and cash flow rights (Wedge), equity ownership by managers (Mg shares), the 
size of the firm (Firm size), return on assets (ROA), leverage (Leverage), sales growth 





empirical evidence for the impact of these variables on tunneling is relatively well known so 
we only provide a brief discussion. 
 Before the non-tradable share (NTS) reform started in the middle of 2005, a high 
proportion of listed firms’ outstanding shares were mainly held by blockholders, including 
controlling shareholders, and were not tradable in the stock exchanges. Thus, controlling 
shareholders were not too concerned about negative market reactions to their tunneling 
behavior, but after NTS reform the controlling shareholders would have less incentive to 
tunnel listed firms because they must now balance their private benefits from tunneling with 
any loss from negative market reactions. Therefore, we expect a negative impact of Reform 
on tunneling. Controlling shareholders have more incentive to extract private benefits from 
the firm if there is a divergence between their control rights and cash flow rights, while 
managers with a large equity ownership are more concerned about firm performance and 
therefore are less likely to engage in tunneling, ceteris paribus. Large firms are subjected to 
more public scrutiny and are more likely to be located in developed areas with stronger 
institutional development. Thus, we expect a negative association between firm size and 
tunneling. Tunneling is expected to have an adverse impact on firm performance, so 
controlling shareholders must consider the trade-off between private benefits from tunneling 
and returns from future growth. The potential cost of tunneling for controlling shareholders is 
higher for firms with higher ROA and sales growth so we expect that the impact of both ROA 
and sales growth on tunneling would be negative. While we expect a negative association 
between board independence and tunneling, the relationship between leverage and tunneling 
is not as clear cut as it may appear. Friedman et al. (2003) argue that debt represents a 
commitment by controlling shareholders to prop up the firm when a moderately adverse 
shock occurs, but high leverage may lead controlling shareholders to abandon or loot the firm 





and state owned banks are the dominant players in the banking sector. A high leverage could 
indicate government support (through state owned banks), making a firm less concerned 
about negative market reactions to tunneling.  
 We also include industry and year dummy variables in all the regression analyses. 
Industry dummy variables are based on the one-digit industry codes published by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which classifies all listed firms into 13 broad 
industries (12 industries if the financial service industry is excluded). Detailed descriptions of 
main variables used in this paper are reported in Table 1. To minimize the influence of 
extreme values, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
< Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
4.3. Descriptive statistics 
 Panel A in Table 2 reports the distribution of firms with political connections and 
firms with founder-managers by year, for private firms and for SOEs, respectively. The data 
shows that a total of 9499 firms (or firm-year observations) consists of 3416 (or 35.96%) 
firms where a private entity is the ultimate largest shareholder, and 6083 (or 64.04%) firms 
where the state or a government agency is the ultimate largest shareholder. The proportion of 
private firms in our sample is higher than in many previous studies (e.g., Chen et al., 2009; 
Peng et al., 2011), probably because our sample covers a more recent period and private firms 
accounted for a larger proportion of all newly listed firms during this period.  
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
Across the whole sample period, about 36.50% of private firms and 35.23% of SOEs 
are politically connected. On a year-by-year basis the percentage of politically connected 
firms is relatively stable; this is why we are unable to test how changes in political 





Regarding the percentage of firms with founder-managers, it is higher in private firms 
(33.08%) than in SOEs (14.68%). Also, the percentage of founder-manager firms is much 
higher than in the US (about 11%, see Anderson and Reeb, 2003 and Adams et al., 2005). 
This significant difference clearly reflects the fact that the Chinese stock markets are in their 
early stage of development. The data also shows that the percentage of private firms with 
founder-managers is rising steadily while the percentage of SOEs with founder-manager is 
declining. There are two possible explanations for this, the increasing number of newly listed 
private firms (which often have a founder-manager) and/or the promotion or retirement of 
founder-managers in SOEs.  
Panel B in Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of tunneling measured by “other 
receivables”, a proxy for fund occupation by controlling shareholders. The data shows that 
almost all sample firms report “other receivables” in their balance sheets, with the balance 
representing 6.00% of total assets (or 138 million RMB) for privately controlled firms and 
3.90% of total assets (or 227 million RMB) for SOEs. These occupied funds are charged very 
low interest, even zero, and in many cases they are never paid back, which could have 
significant adverse economic consequences for the listed firms (Jiang et al., 2010).  
Panel B also reveals three clear patterns. First, on average, private firms report more 
tunneling than SOEs, either on an aggregated base or on a year-by-year base. Second, during 
our sample period, the severity of tunneling is on the decline, suggesting that enhancement in 
laws and regulations have had some effects in reducing tunneling. Nonetheless, at the end of 
2010, “other receivables” still represents 2.50% of total assets in private firms and 1.90% in 
SOEs. Third, the difference in tunneling between private firms and SOEs has also narrowed. 
For example, at the end of 2004, “other receivables” represented 11.20% of total assets for 





difference narrows to 0.60%, which may suggest that relevant laws and regulations have had 
a larger effect on private firms than on SOEs. 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics that are broken down by manager political 
connection and founder status. Private firms without politically connected managers report 
tunneling that represents 7.00% of total assets, which is significantly higher than the 4.10% 
reported by those private firms with connected managers. In contrast, SOEs with politically 
connected managers report significantly more tunneling than those SOEs without connected 
managers (4.40% vs. 3.70%, significant at the 1% level). Private firms without founder-
managers report tunneling that represents 7.40% of total assets, which almost triples the 
reported tunneling (2.50%) for those with founder-managers. SOEs with founder-managers 
also report significantly less tunneling than those without founder-managers, but the 
difference is smaller than in private firms.  The above statistics provide initial evidences that 
coincide with our hypotheses 1a, 1b and 3.  
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
A manager is more likely to be politically connected if they are a founder-manager, 
which can be observed in both private firms and SOEs. For both private firms and SOEs, the 
divergence between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights is 
smaller if a firm has a politically connected or founder-manager. These firms are also 
significantly larger. Firms with founder-managers have significantly lower leverage than 
those without, which may imply they take less risk. What is also notable is that private firms 
with politically connected managers have a leverage ratio of 0.52, which is only slightly 
higher than half the leverage ratio for those without connected managers. This is certainly 
worth further investigation. There is no significant difference in performance (either ROA or 
sales growth) between firms with/without politically connected managers or founder-





than SOEs without founder-managers, which may imply that the former are more concerned 
about firm performance than the latter. Finally, private firms with founder-mangers have a 
significantly higher percentage of independent directors, which indicates that the internal 
corporate governance in these firms is better.  
To summarize, firms with and without politically connected managers or founder-
managers differ significantly in their tunneling behavior. They also differ significantly in size 
and capital structure. We next formally examine how these factors affect firm tunneling 
behavior.  
 
5. Multivariate results 
5.1. Impact of political connection on tunneling 
Table 4 arranges the results of OLS regressions of tunneling on manager political 
connection. We run two sets of regressions, one for private firms, reported in columns (1) to 
(4), and the other for SOEs, reported in columns (5) to (8). In each of the regressions, the 
dependent variable is Tunneling measured by the ratio of “other receivables” to total assets. 
We use four specifications for each set of regressions. First, we only control Reform in 
columns (1) and (5), without considering other control variables. We then add control for 
wedge – the divergence between controlling shareholders’ control rights and cash flow rights, 
as well as year and industry effects, in columns (2) and (6). We further include manager 
equity ownership and firm leverage in columns (3) and (7).  Existing literature indicates there 
is a strong association between firm tunneling and these three factors. Finally, we include 
more other control variables in columns (4) and (8). The p-values reported in parentheses are 
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White (1980). 





Throughout columns (1) to (4), the coefficient of Political connection is negative and 
significant at least at the 5% level. The results indicate that private firms with politically 
connected managers have significantly less tunneling than those without connected managers, 
which confirms the univariate results reported in Table 3. In contrast, the coefficient of 
Political connection in columns (5) to (8) is positive and significant at the 1% level, which 
indicates that SOEs with politically connected managers have significantly more tunneling 
than those SOEs without connected managers. These results are also consistent with the 
univariate results in Table 3.  
Overall, the results in Table 4 confirm H1a and H1b. That is, manager political 
connection is negatively related to firm tunneling in private firms, but is positively related to 
tunneling in SOEs. Private firms seek political connections to protect themselves from 
disadvantage in the competition for resources while they have less responsibility to fulfill 
social goals. Manager political connection in SOEs is a tool for their parent corporations to 
obtain feedback and for the government to fulfill social goals.    
The coefficients of control variables are generally in line with our expectations. 
Tunneling by controlling shareholders has been significantly reduced since the completion of 
NTS reform, indicating a better alignment between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders after the NTS reform. Large firms (Firm size), better performing (ROA), high 
growth (Growth) and manager equity ownership (Mg shares) have less tunneling. However, 
firm leverage (Leverage) is positively and significantly related to tunneling. This result 
contradicts the prediction by Friedman et al. (2003), who argue that debt may act as a 
commitment by controlling shareholders to prop up the firms when needed. Consistent with 
some existing studies (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang 2002), we find a strong 






5.2. Impact of the type and level of political connection on tunneling 
 Earlier in Section 3.2.2, we classify political connection into official-type and 
CPC/CPPCC-type, at either local or central hierarchy. Actually, a firm’s political connection 
can be both official-type and CPC/CPPCC-type (Dual-type), because a CEO may be official-
type connected and a chairman may be CPC/CPPCC-type connected in a firm, or vice versa. 
Those managers with various political connections have different incentive for tunneling. The 
regression results are reported in Table 5, and as in Table 4, we run a set of regressions for 
private firms and SOEs, respectively.  
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
 We first analyze the results for private firms. Column (1) contains only private firms 
with managers who have official-type political connection and private firms without 
politically connected managers. The coefficient of either Local official PC or Central official 
PC is positive but insignificant, which indicates that official-type political connection has no 
significant impact on tunneling in private firms. Column (2) contains only private firms with 
managers who have CPC/CPPCC-type political connection and private firms without 
politically connected managers. Both of the coefficients of Local CPC/CPPCC and Central 
CPC/CPPCC are negative and significant, which indicates that this type of political 
connection significantly reduces firm tunneling. The coefficient of Central CPC/CPPCC is 
much larger than Local CPC/CPPCC (-0.012 vs. -0.006), which suggests that the higher the 
level of CPC/CPPCC-type connections, the greater the impact it has in reducing firm 
tunneling. Column (3) contains only private firms with Dual-type political connections and 
private firms without political connected managers. Both of the coefficients of Local dual PC 
and Central dual PC are insignificant. This is not surprising since official-type and 
CPC/CPPCC-type connections have an opposite impact on tunneling and offset each other. 





CPC/CPPCC and Central CPC/CPPCC, which suggests that in private firms, CPC/CPPCC-
type political connections have a greater impact on tunneling than official-type political 
connections.  This can be confirmed by the results in Table 4, where overall manager political 
connection has a significantly negative impact on tunneling in private firms. Column (4) 
contains all the private firms. The sign and significance of the coefficient of each of these six 
types of political connections generally confirms those in columns (1) to (3), with the 
exception of Central dual PC, which becomes significant in the full sub-sample regression.  
The firm samples in columns (5) to (8) are defined the same as columns (1) to (4), 
with the exception of state ownership. As for SOEs, the results in columns (5) to (8) show 
that manager official-type political connection significantly increases tunneling, and this 
positive impact is significantly greater if the connection is at the central level than at the local 
level (0.024 vs. 0.009 in column (5) and 0.023 vs. 0.008 in column (8), all significant at the 1% 
level). The coefficient of Central CPC/CPPCC is -0.004 and is significant at the 5% level, 
which indicates that manager CPC/CPPCC-type political connection at the central level 
significantly reduces tunneling at SOEs, while CPC/CPPCC-type political connection at the 
local level has a negative but insignificant impact on tunneling in SOEs.  
Overall, the regression results in Table 5 partially confirm H2a and H2b. Manager 
official-type political connection has a positive impact on tunneling, but this positive impact 
is significant only in SOEs. Manager CPC/CPPCC-type political connection has a negative 
impact on tunneling, but this negative impact is more significant in private firms than in 
SOEs. With both types of political connections, those at the central level are more influential 
than those at the local level, with respect to their impact on firm tunneling. Managers with 
official-type political connection have an incentive to seek rent because they are can bring 
benefit to the firms. They also expect political promotion by satisfying governmental 





benefits to the firms, but they have the incentive and ability to protect the firm from adverse 
events such as tunneling. The incentive for managers with a central level of connection is 
higher than for managers with local levels of connection.   
 
5.3. Impact of founder-manager and the interactive impact between political connection and 
founder-manager on tunneling 
Based on our earlier analysis in Section 3.2.3, we examine the effect of founder-
managers and the interactive effect of founder-managers with political connection on firm 
tunneling. Table 6 reports the results of regression of tunneling on firm founder status and its 
intertwining with either official-type, CPC/CPPCC-type, or Dual-type political connection. 
The sample of firms in each column in Table 6 is defined the same as equivalent columns in 
Table 5, as shown by the title of each column.       
< Insert Table 6 about here >  
 On the left side, regarding private firms, the coefficients of the stand-alone variables 
of Official PC, CPC/CPPCC, and Dual PC are consistent with those in Table 5, that is, only 
CPC/CPPCC-type political connection has a significantly negative impact on tunneling. In 
every column the coefficient of Founder is negative and significant at the 1% level, which 
confirms our expectation that private firms with founder-managers have significantly less 
tunneling than those without. The coefficients of the interactions between the type of political 
connection and founder-manager are all negative. These results indicate that when a firm has 
a politically connected manager who is also a founder, there is less tunneling than in those 
firms with politically connected but non-founder managers, regardless of the type of political 
connection. However, of these three interactions, only the coefficient of 
CPC/CPPCC*Founder is significant. The results in columns (4) and (5) of all private firms 





CPC/CPPCC-type of political connection is the main driver of the overall impact of political 
connection on tunneling in private firms.  
 On the right side, regarding SOEs, the coefficient of Founder is negative and 
significant at the 5% level in every column, which indicates that SOEs with a founder-
manager have significantly less tunneling than those without. The coefficients of the stand-
alone variables of Official PC, CPC/CPPCC, and Dual PC also confirm the results in Table 5. 
The coefficients of all three interactions between the type of political connection and 
founder-manager are negative, but only Official PC*Founder is insignificant, which indicates 
that founder-managers do not significantly reduce tunneling in those SOEs that have official-
type political connection, because official-type political connection leads to significant 
tunneling in SOEs. Of particular interest is the interaction term Dual PC*Founder.  The 
coefficient of the stand-alone variable Dual PC is positive and significant, thus the negative 
and significant coefficient of Dual PC*Founder suggests that founder-managers have a 
strong reductive impact on tunneling in SOEs.  
  Table 7 reports the results of regression of tunneling on manager’s founder status and 
its intertwining with either local level or central level political connection.  Columns (1) to (3) 
report the regression results for private firms and columns (4) to (6) report the results for 
SOEs. 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
The coefficient of Central PC is negative and significant in columns (1) to (3), but the 
coefficient of Local PC is insignificant. In columns (4) to (6), although all the coefficients of 
Central PC and Local PC are positive and significant at the 1% level, the former are about 
double the magnitude for the latter. These results confirm the results in Table 5 where 
manager political connections at the central level have a greater impact on tunneling than 





alone variable Founder and the coefficient of the interaction term Central PC*Founder are 
negative and significant, while the coefficient of Local PC*Founder is insignificant. These 
results indicate that the negative relation between founder-manager and tunneling is stronger 
in firms with centrally connected managers than in firms with locally connected managers 
only.  
Thus, the results in Tables 6 and 7 confirm H3 that, for both private firms and SOEs, 
those firms with founder-managers have significantly less tunneling than those without. The 
negative effects of founder-managers on tunneling are also observed in politically connected 
firms. Founder managers have a special incentive to maintain the firm’s long term 
development and survival. The tradeoff between interest and effort is greater from a founder 
manager’s perspective than from a politically connected manager’s perspective.     
 
5.4. Difference between the chairman’s and the CEO’s political connection on tunneling 
 We hypothesize in Section 3.3.4 that the chairman’s political connection is more 
influential on firm tunneling than the CEO’s political connection, and in this section we 
formally test this hypothesis. The results for private firms are reported in columns (1) to (3) 
and the results for SOEs are reported in columns (4) to (6) of Table 8. 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
 The sample in Column (1) contains private firms where the chairman is politically 
connected (regardless of the type of connection) and private firms without political 
connection. The sample in Column (2) contains private firms where the CEO is politically 
connected and private firms without political connection. In 735 of our 3416 private firms the 
chairman and CEO is the same person. Thus, as general practice, we introduce a new control 
variable Duality which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the chairman and the 





significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of CEO PC in column (2) is positive but 
insignificant. The results in column (3), which contains all private firms, are consistent with 
those in columns (1) and (2). Recall the results in Table 4 where the chairman’s and CEO’s 
political connections are aggregated into a single variable Political connection; the 
coefficient of Political connection in column (4) in Table 4 is negative and significant. Thus, 
we can conclude that for private firms, the overall impact of manager political connection on 
tunneling is negative and almost certainly driven by the chairman’s political connection 
because the CEO’s political connection has an opposite (although insignificant) impact.  
 The samples in columns (4) to (6) are similarly designed as those in columns (1) to (3) 
respectively, except that private firms are replaced by SOEs.  The coefficient of Chair PC in 
column (4) and (6) is positive and significant at the 1% level, but the coefficient of CEO PC 
is negative but insignificant. In Table 4 the coefficient of Political connection is positive and 
significant for SOEs, so for SOEs, the overall impact of manager political connection on 
tunneling is also almost certainly driven by the chairman’s political connection. Thus, the 
results in Table 8 support H4 that, for private firms and SOEs, the chairman’s political 
connection is more influential than the CEO’s political connection, with respect to their 
impacts on firm tunneling. In the Chinese context, chairmen are not only (the representatives) 
controlling shareholders, they are also involved in routine decision making, so the chairmen, 
not CEOs, are the top executives and wield the most power.  
 
6. Robustness checks 
 The preceding analyses provide evidence on the relation between manager political 
connection and firm tunneling. There is a potential endogeneity problem particularly for 
firms with severe tunneling, because they are more likely to appoint politically connected 





reactions. In this section, we address the potential endogeneity concern and then test the 
sensitivity of our results with alternative model specifications.  
 
6.1. Endogeneity of political connection  
One general practice used to solve the endogeneity problem is the instrumental 
variable (IV) approach. An appropriate IV needs to satisfy two conditions. First, the IV needs 
to be exogenous in the main regressions, and second the IV must be correlated to the 
endogenous variable, conditional on other covariates. We use three IVs in this study; the first 
IV is the registered unemployment rate (Unemployment) in the province where a firm is 
headquartered, the second IV is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (Log GDP) in the 
province where a firm is headquartered, and the third IV is the ratio of total domestic deposits 
in financial institutions to total GDP (Savings ratio) in the province where a firm is 
headquartered. These IVs are obtained directly from the website of the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBSC) or calculated based on the data from the NBSC. All these three 
IVs are related to the availability of capital, in that it is easier for a firm to obtain external 
financing if it is located in regions with a lower unemployment rate, higher GDP per capita, 
and a higher savings to GDP ratio. Thus, firms in these regions have fewer incentives to 
establish political connection. Furthermore, governments (the controlling shareholders of 
SOEs) in these regions have less political and social pressure (e.g., redundant workers and 
social unrest) to intervene into the operations of SOEs by appointing politically connected 
managers. We, however, do not expect these three IVs to have a significant impact on firm 
tunneling.9 Thus, all these three IVs satisfy the two conditions for an appropriate IV.  
                                                          
9 In unreported results, we run regressions of firm tunneling on these three IVs. After controlling for other 





We use the regressions in Table 6 as examples for this robustness test and the results 
are arranged in Table 9. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) model is applied. In the first 
stage, we run probit regressions of manager political connection type on these three IVs. All 
the control variables used in the main regressions in Table 6 are also included in the first 
stage. In the second stage the predicted values from the first stage are used as the key 
independent variable, as well as other control variables. In Table 9, columns (1) to (3) and 
columns (5) to (7) report the results of the first stage for private firms and SOEs, respectively. 
Columns (4) and (8) report the results of the second stage for private firms and SOEs, 
respectively. 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
 In columns (1) to (3), the dependent variables are dummies of Official PC, 
CPC/CPPCC, and Dual PC. It can be seen from the negative and significant coefficients, that 
Unemployment, Log GDP, and Savings ratio impact the probability of a firm establishing 
political connection, which satisfies the IV selection criteria.  In column (4), the dependent 
variable is Tunneling and the key independent variables, namely Official PC, CPC/CPPCC, 
and Dual PC, are the predicted values (labeled “instrumented”) from the first stage 
regressions. If we compare the results in column (4) with the corresponding results in column 
(5) in Table 6, it is obvious that the coefficients are of the same sign but are either larger or 
more significant than those in Table 6. For example, the coefficient of CPC/CPPCC in 
column (4) in Table 9 is -0.172, while the coefficient of CPC/CPPCC in column (5) in Table 
6 is -0.014. A similar comparison can be made between the SOEs in Table 6 and the SOEs in 
Table 9.  Thus, the results from the 2SLS regressions confirm the results in Table 6.  
We argue that political connection has different impacts in private firms and SOEs. 
Therefore, the potential endogeneity problems could be also different in these two types of 





their firms perform well, indicating these firms have less severe tunneling. While for SOEs, 
governments appoint politically connected managers to mitigate adverse impact of tunneling 
on firm performance and stock market reactions. We therefore use the propensity score 
matching (PSM) approach to address such endogeneity concern. 10 In untabulated results, the 
impacts of Official PC, CPC/CPPCC, and Dual PC are largely consistent with those reported 
in Table 5. Manager CPC/CPPCC-type connection (central and local combined) has a 
negative and significant impact on tunneling in private firms (coef. = -0.009, p = 0.042) and 
manager official-type connection (central and local combined) has a positive and significant 
impact on tunneling in SOEs (coef. = 0.014, p = 0.000).  
 
6.2. Alternative regression specifications 
  In our main analyses the divergence (Wedge) between the controlling shareholder’s 
control rights and cash flow rights is a continuous variable measured by the difference. As a 
robustness test, we replace this continuous variable with a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if a divergence exists and zero otherwise. Our main results remain unchanged with 
this alternative definition. Literature finds that institutional development is an important 
factor that affects controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior, so to control for the 
variations in institutional development in different regions, we add a dummy variable for 




To fill a gap in the literature, we investigate whether and how managers’ political 
connection status and founder status affect firm tunneling behaviour, using a sample of 9499 
                                                          





firm-year observations of publicly listed firms over the period of 2004–2010. We find that 
both manager political connection and founder status have a significant impact on firm’s 
tunneling behavior. For private firms overall manager political connection is negatively 
related to firm tunneling. This negative relation is almost entirely driven by manager’s 
CPC/CPPCC-type political connection, and this negative relation is stronger for political 
connections at the central level than at the local levels. In contrast, for SOEs, overall manager 
political connection is positively related to firm tunneling. This positive relation is almost 
entirely driven by manager’s official-type connection, and this positive relation is greater for 
political connections at the central level than at the local levels.   
These results indicate that manager political connection in private firms is more likely 
to compete for resources and protect firms from adverse events. Manager political connection 
in SOEs is more likely to be formed to fulfill the social goals of governments. Official-type 
connected managers may have a rent seeking incentive, while CPC/CPPCC-type connected 
managers are better able to prevent firms from tunneling. The motivation and capabilities are 
more powerful if the political connection is at the central level.    
We also find that for both private firms and SOEs, firms with founder-managers have 
more resistance to tunneling than those without because founder-managers have higher 
monetary interests than non-founder-managers, and the interest and effort required for a 
tradeoff is greater from a founder-manager’s perspective than from a politically connected 
manager’s perspective.  Therefore, if a politically connected manager is also a founder, the 
possibility of tunneling due to political connection, if it exists, is also reduced. The incentive 
for a politically connected founder-manager to tunnel is weaker than a politically connected 
non-founder-manager. 
Finally, we test the impact of the chairman’s and the CEO’s political connection on 





significantly greater impact on tunneling than the CEO’s political connection. Thus our 
results support the notion that the chairman, rather than the CEO, is the top executive in 
Chinese firms. This finding may have important implications for research regarding the 
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Table1. Descriptions of main variables used in the analyses. 
  
Variable Description 
Dependent variables  
Tunneling Total amount of “other receivables” / total assets (Jiang et al., 2010) 
Key independent variables  
Political connection Dummy variable that equals 1  if either (or both) the Chairman or the CEO is a current or former government official, military officer or member of the Chinese People’s 
Congress (CPC) or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); zero otherwise 
Official PC Dummy  variable that equals 1  if either (or both) the Chairman or the CEO is a current or former government official or military officer and neither of them is a member of 
the CPC or CPPCC; zero otherwise 
CPC/CPPCC Dummy variable that equals 1  if either (or both) the Chairman or the CEO is a current or former member of the CPC or CPPCC and neither of them is a current or former 
government official or military officer; zero otherwise 
Dual PC Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has both official-type PC and CPC/CPPCC-type PC; zero otherwise 
Local PC Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has only local level (provincial or lower) political connection 
Central PC Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has central level political connection 
Chair PC Dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman has political connection; zero otherwise 
CEO PC Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO has political connection; zero otherwise 
Founder Dummy variable that equals 1 if the Chairman or the CEO is a founder or a main executive when the firm was first incorporated (including when spun-off); zero otherwise 
Control variables  
Reform Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has completed the non-tradable share reform at the end of the year; zero otherwise 
Wedge The difference between the ultimate largest shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights. 
Mg shares Number of shares held by top executives / total number of shares outstanding  
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets 
ROA Net income / total assets 
Leverage Total liabilities / total assets 
Growth (Total sales this year – total sales last year) / total sales last year  
Board independence (Independence) Number of independent directors / total number of directors 
Duality Dummy variable that equals 1 if the Chair and the CEO is the same person; zero otherwise 
Instrumental variables  
Unemployment Registered unemployment rate in the province in which a firm is headquartered 
Log GDP Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in the province in which a firm is headquartered 





Table 2. Descriptive statistics of manager political connection, founder status, and overall level of tunneling. 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of manager political connection and founder-managers for private firms and SOEs. Panel A reports sample breakdown across years. Panel B 
reports the overall level of tunneling across years. The definitions of Political connection, Founder, and Tunneling are reported in Table 1. Proportion is calculated by dividing the number of 
firms with political connection or founder-manager by the total number of firms in that category. For example, there are 339 private firms in 2004 of which 119 have political connections. 
Therefore, the proportion of political connection is 119/339=35.10%.  
  
 
 Panel A: The proportion of political connection and founder-manager firms by year   Panel B: Tunneling by year 
Year Private Firms  State-owned enterprises (SOEs)  Private firms 
 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 





















2004 339 119 (35.10%) 
84 




(15.80%)  339 0.112 0.047 
 
842 0.065 0.029 
2005 400 140 (35.00%) 
113 




(16.29%)  400 0.108 0.039 
 
878 0.062 0.026 
2006 429 152 (35.43%) 
121 




(15.41%)  429 0.101 0.033 
 
850 0.055 0.020 
2007 474 172 (36.29%) 
141 




(15.31%)  474 0.052 0.021 
 
848 0.030 0.013 
2008 538 192 (35.69%) 
193 




(14.82%)  536 0.036 0.015 
 
881 0.025 0.011 
2009 596 228 (38.26%) 
225 




(13.54%)  596 0.030 0.012 
 
885 0.020 0.009 
2010 640 244 (38.13%) 
253 




(11.74%)  639 0.025 0.011 
 
894 0.019 0.008 
Total 3416 1247 (36.50%) 
1130 




(14.68%)  3413 0.060 0.019 
 





Table 3. Univariate analyses on mean differences for main variables. 
Variables include Tunneling, Political connection, Founder, and other firm characteristics. The definitions of these variables are reported in Table 1. P-values using the two-tailed t-test (Mann-






 Private firms State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 















 (1) (2) (1) –(2) (3) (4) (3) – (4) (5) (6) (5) –(6) (7) (8) (7) – (8) 
Tunneling 0.041 0.070 -0.029*** (0.000) 0.025 0.074 
-0.049*** 
(0.000) 0.044 0.037 
0.007*** 




Connection     0.516 0.302 
0.214*** 
(0.00)    0.456 0.335 
0.121*** 
(0.000) 
Founder 0.416 0.224 0.192*** (0.000)    0.190 0.123 
0.067*** 
(0.000)    
Reform 0.803 0.757 0.046*** (0.001) 0.869 0.734 
0.135*** 
(0.000) 0.706 0.712 
-0.006 
(0.322) 0.700 0.711 
-0.011 
(0.246) 
Wedge 0.086 0.092 -0.006** (0.032) 0.073 0.097 
-0.024*** 
(0.000) 0.030 0.045 
-0.015*** 
(0.000) 0.032 0.041 
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
Mg shares 0.034 0.027 0.007** (0.018) 0.079 0.009 
0.070*** 
(0.000) <0.001 0.001 
-0.001*** 




(billion) 3.230 1.780 
1.450*** 
(0.000) 2.940 2.050 
0.890*** 
(0.000) 6.830 5.260 
1.570*** 
(0.002) 6.450 5.710 
0.740* 
(0.076) 
ROA 0.075 0.049 0.026 (0.760) 0.102 0.044 
0.058 
(0.263) 0.021 0.088 
-0.067 
(0.106) 0.095 0.059 
0.036* 
(0.091) 
Leverage 0.520 1.024 -0.504*** (0.000) 0.440 1.006 
-0.566*** 
(0.000) 0.538 0.541 
-0.003 
(0.350) 0.500 0.547 
-0.047*** 
(0.000) 
Growth  0.270 0.238 0.032* (0.100) 0.255 0.247 
0.008 
(0.368) 0.234 0.232 
0.002 
(0.452) 0.228 0.233 
-0.005 
(0.371) 
Independence 0.363 0.363 0.000 (0.568) 0.368 0.361 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 0.353 0.353 
0.000 
(0.593) 0.353 0.353 
0.000 
(0.768) 






Table 4. Impact of manager political connection on firm tunneling behavior. 
This table presents OLS regression results of the impacts of manager political connection on firm tunneling behavior. The dependent variable is Tunneling and the key independent variable is 
Political connection. Columns (1) to (4) report the results for private firms and columns (5) to (8) report the results for SOEs. The definitions of all variables are reported in Table 1. P-values 
based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Dependent variable:  Tunneling 
 Private firms State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 



























































Mg shares   -0.084*** (0.000) 
-0.100*** 
(0.000) 




Firm size    -0.025*** (0.000) 
   -0.012*** 
(0.000) 
ROA    -0.001*** (0.000) 
   -0.006*** 
(0.009) 
Leverage   0.003** (0.049) 
0.003** 
(0.025) 




Growth    -0.006 (0.104) 
   -0.009*** 
(0.000) 
Independence    -0.004 (0.907) 
   0.009 
(0.598) 
Year effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 3416 3416 3416 3416 6083 6083 6083 6083 
R-squared 0.139 0.190 0.208 0.269 0.090 0.143 0.199 0.251 





Table 5. Impact of manager political connection type and connection level on firm tunneling behavior. 
This table presents OLS regression results of the impacts of different types of manager political connections on firm tunneling behavior. The dependent variable is Tunneling and the key 
independent variables are three types of political connections, namely Official PC, CPC/CPPCC, and Both PC. Columns (1) to (4) report the results for private firms and columns (5) to (8) report 
 Dependent variable: Tunneling 
Private firms State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
Official PC firms 
vs. Non-PC firms 
CPC/CPPCC firms 
vs. Non-PC firms 
Dual PC firms 
vs. Non-PC firms All private firms 
Official PC firms 
vs. Non-PC firms 
CPC/CPPCC firms 
vs. Non-PC firms 
Dual PC firms 
vs. Non-PC firms All SOEs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 















Local official PC 0.003 (0.643) 




  0.008*** 
(0.001) 
Central official PC 0.016 (0.380) 




  0.023*** 
(0.000) 














Local dual PC   -0.014 (0.181) 
-0.013 
(0.217) 




Central dual PC   -0.001 (0.964) 
-0.015* 
(0.098) 




























































































































Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 2450 3013 2281 3416 5394 4442 4127 6083 
R-squared 0.283 0.279 0.287 0.251 0.255 0.242 0.238 0.254 





the results for SOEs. Columns (1) and (5) contain only those firms with managers who have official-type political connection and firms without connected managers. Columns (2) and (6) 
contain only those firms with managers who have CPC/CPPCC-type political connection and firms without connected managers. Columns (3) and (7) contain only those firms with managers 
who have both official-type and CPC/CPPCC-type political connection and firms without connected managers. Columns (4) and (8) contain all private firms and all SOEs, respectively. The 
definitions of all variables are reported in Table 1. P-values based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 







Table 6. Interactive impact of manager political connection type and founder status on firm tunneling behavior. 
 Dependent variable: Tunneling 
 Private firms State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 




Dual PC vs. 
Non-PC All private firms All private firms 




Dual PC vs. 
Non-PC All SOEs All SOEs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 





















   -0.009** 
(0.038) 
    0.009*** 
(0.000) 
 
Official PC <0.001 (0.953) 




   0.011*** 
(0.000) 
CPC/CPPCC  -0.013*** (0.004) 




  -0.002 
(0.541) 
Dual PC   -0.012 (0.243) 
 -0.013 
(0.192) 























PC * Founder    -0.016*** (0.006) 
    -0.002 
(0.564) 
 
Official PC *Founder -0.021 (0.139) 




   <-0.001 
(0.949) 
CPC/CPPCC*Founder  -0.021*** (0.000) 




  -0.008* 
(0.097) 
Dual PC * Founder   <-0.001 (0.994) 
 -0.001 
(0.961) 




























































































































































Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





This table presents OLS regression results of the impacts of manager political connections type, founder status, and interaction between political connection type and founder status on firm 
tunneling behavior. The dependent variable is Tunneling and the key independent variables are three types of political connections (namely Official PC, CPC/CPPCC, and Dual PC), Founder, 
and interactions between Political connection and Founder. Columns (1) to (5) report the results for private firms and columns (6) to (10) report the results for SOEs. Columns (1) and (6) 
contain only those firms with managers who have official-type political connection and firms without connected managers. Columns (2) and (7) contain only those firms with managers who 
have CPC/CPPCC-type political connection and firms without connected managers. Columns (3) and (8) contain only those firms with managers who have both official-type and CPC/CPPCC-
type political connection and firms without connected managers. Columns (4) and (5) and columns (9) and (10) contain all private firms and all SOEs, respectively. The definitions of all 
variables are reported in Table 1. P-values based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
R-squared 0.287 0.284 0.292 0.274 0.275 0.254 0.242 0.238 0.252 0.253 





Table 7. Interactive impact of manager political connection level and founder status on firm tunneling behavior. 
This table presents OLS regression results of the impacts of manager political connections level, founder status, and interaction between political connection level and founder status on firm 
tunneling behavior. The dependent variable is Tunneling and the key independent variables are two levels of political connections (namely Local PC and Central PC), Founder, and interactions 
between Political connection and Founder. Columns (1) to (3) report the results for private firms and columns (4) to (6) report the results for SOEs. Columns (1) and (4) test the stand-alone 
impacts of Political connection level on tunneling. Columns (2) and (5) include the interaction terms between Political connection level and Founder. Columns (3) and (6) also include the stand-
alone Founder variable. The definitions of all variables are reported in Table 1. P-values based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: Tunneling 
 Private firms State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 

































Founder   -0.023*** (0.000)   
-0.005** 
(0.043) 






































































































Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 3416 3416 3416 6083 6083 6083 
R-squared 0.269 0.270 0.274 0.251 0.251 0.252 





Table 8. Different impact of the chairman’s political connection and the CEO’s political connection on firm tunneling behavior. 
This table presents OLS regression results of the different impacts of the Chairman’s political connection and the CEO’s political connection on firm tunneling behavior. The dependent 
variable is Tunneling and the key independent variables are Chair PC and CEO PC. Chair PC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman has political connection. CEO PC is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the CEO has political connection. The definitions of all other variables are reported in Table 1. Columns (1) to (3) report the results for private firms and columns (4) to 
(6) report the results for SOEs. P-values based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: Tunneling 
 Private firms State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
 Chair PC firms 
vs. Non-PC firms 
CEO PC firms 
vs. Non-PC firms All private firms 
Chair PC firms 
vs. Non-PC firms 
CEO PC firms 
vs. Non-PC firms All SOEs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




























































































































Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 3282 2721 3416 5867 4776 6083 
R-squared 0.267 0.281 0.270 0.252 0.240 0.252 





Table 9. 2SLS instrumental variable (IV) analyses of impact of manager political connection type, founder status, and their 
interaction on firm tunneling behavior. 
This table presents the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable (IV) regressions of the impacts of 
manager political connection type, founder status, and their interaction on firm tunneling behavior. Columns (1) to (4) 
report the results for private firms and columns (5) to (8) report the results for SOEs. Columns (1) to (3) and columns (5) to 
(7) report the results of the first stage, in which probit regressions are used. The dependent variables in the first-stage 
regressions are three types of political connections, namely Official PC, CPC/CPPCC, and Dual PC.  Columns (4) and (8) 
report the results of the second stage, in which OLS regressions are used. The dependent variable in the second-stage 
regressions is Tunneling. We use three instrumental variables (IVs) in the first stage. These IVs are Unemployment, Log GDP, 
and Savings ratio. The definitions of these three IVs and of all other variables are reported in Table 1. P-values based on 
standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Private firms State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Dependent variables Dependent variables 
Official PC CPC/CPPCC Dual PC Tunneling Official PC CPC/CPPCC Dual PC Tunneling 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















   0.046* 
(0.064) 




   -0.172*** 
(0.006) 




   -0.131** 
(0.038) 
   0.107** 
(0.042) 
Founder    -0.096*** (0.000) 
   -0.039*** 
(0.009) 
Official PC * Founder 
(Instrumented) 
   -0.290*** 
(0.006) 
   0.023** 
(0.035) 
CPC/CPPCC * Founder 
(Instrumented) 
   -0.244*** 
(0.000) 
   -0.051* 
(0.063) 
Dual PC * Founder 
(Instrumented) 
   -0.321* 
(0.068) 
   0.158** 
(0.048) 




























































































































































Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 3416 3416 3416 3416 6083 6083 6083 6083 
Wald Chi2 100.08*** 320.98*** 47.43***  183.22*** 38.74*** 80.31***  
Pseudo R squared 0.054 0.094 0.051  0.030 0.015 0.031  
Log pseudo likelihood -926.600 -1733.162 -477.534  -3244.636 -1706.715 -809.206  
R-squared    0.286    0.253 
F-value    19.37***    22.31*** 
